Conflict Unmentioned: Insights from Afghanistan for the Military
In a recent episode of the Social Science of War podcast, produced by the Department of Social Sciences at West Point, Major Sam Wilkins, an active duty US Army Special Forces officer and current instructor in the same department, led a discussion on the lessons the US military, particularly the US Army, should learn from the 20-year war in Afghanistan.
Major Wilkins, who has multiple deployments to Africa under his belt and has published several articles on Afghanistan and irregular warfare, was joined by three guests with extensive and diverse experience in Afghanistan. Retired Lieutenant General Doug Lute, a former assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan, was one of the guests. Dr. Jason Lyall, an associate professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, another guest, has conducted fieldwork in Afghanistan as a scholar, published extensively on counterinsurgency and conflict in fragile states, and is currently writing a book on lessons learned from the American war in Afghanistan.
The podcast delved into the theoretical assumptions underpinning US counterinsurgency doctrine as implemented in Afghanistan. Scholars have conducted extensive research on population-centric counterinsurgency, with many recent studies finding weak evidence that counterinsurgency as implemented in Afghanistan works.
The conversation discussed US performance in multiple key areas. Strategic design, understanding of the operational and strategic environment, security force assistance, building effective partner forces, encouraging tactical-level units to focus on partner forces, and overmilitarization of efforts were some of the topics covered.
One of the key lessons that emerged from the discussion was the understanding of the limits of military power in nation-building and counterinsurgency. The war demonstrated the difficulty of imposing political structures and security without deep cultural and political knowledge.
Another important lesson was the necessity of comprehensive strategy integrating military, political, and developmental efforts. Success required not just combat operations but support for governance, rule of law, and economic development.
The importance of adapting to asymmetric warfare and insurgent tactics was also highlighted. Afghan insurgents often used guerrilla tactics, requiring the Army to evolve tactics and technologies accordingly.
The value of local partnerships and building Afghan security forces was another crucial point. The long-term viability depended on training and empowering Afghan forces rather than indefinite foreign troop presence.
The need for clear political objectives and exit strategies was also emphasized. The shift in objectives over two decades contributed to challenges in defining success and deciding how to end involvement.
If you're interested in gaining a deeper understanding of these lessons and the discussion on the Social Science of War podcast, Episode 4 of Season 1, I would recommend consulting the podcast's official site or episode notes for precise insights discussed there. The podcast can be found on various social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn) and can be emailed or printed for your convenience.
- The US military, particularly the US Army, should learn from the 20-year war in Afghanistan that the limits of military power in nation-building and counterinsurgency are significant, as the war demonstrated the difficulty of imposing political structures and security without deep cultural and political knowledge.
- The importance of adapting to asymmetric warfare and insurgent tactics was highlighted in the discussion, with Afghan insurgents often using guerrilla tactics, requiring the Army to evolve tactics and technologies accordingly.
- In terms of strategy, it was emphasized that success required not just combat operations but support for governance, rule of law, and economic development, necessitating a comprehensive strategy integrating military, political, and developmental efforts.
- The need for clear political objectives and exit strategies was also emphasized, with the shifting objectives over two decades contributing to challenges in defining success and deciding how to end involvement. Further understanding of these lessons can be gained through the Social Science of War podcast, available on various social media platforms and their official site.
