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Unveiling Nomenclature Niceties: The Disaggregation Challenge Imperiling Antiterrorism Policies

Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau met a violent end in June, as he allegedly detonated a suicide bomb while facing off against members of the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP). Known for his campaign of terror against the northeastern Nigerian populace and his infamous kidnapping of...

Counterterrorism Efforts Thwarted by Name Disaggregation Issue: An Overview
Counterterrorism Efforts Thwarted by Name Disaggregation Issue: An Overview

Unveiling Nomenclature Niceties: The Disaggregation Challenge Imperiling Antiterrorism Policies

In the troubled northeastern region of Nigeria, the designation 'Boko Haram' is still commonly used to refer to various iterations and branches of the groups, past and present. This term, originally associated with Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS), has become a catch-all phrase that encompasses the conflict between JAS and ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province).

The primary difference between these two factions lies in their targeting and tactics. ISWAP, backed by the Islamic State, primarily attacks military positions and has overrun numerous Nigerian military outposts. On the other hand, JAS, under the leadership of the late Abubakar Shekau, has increasingly targeted civilians and suspected collaborators, engaging in kidnappings for ransom and robberies.

Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, met his end in June via a suicide bomb. However, his death did not mark the end of JAS. The faction remains active, noted for its indiscriminate violence, including against Muslims. Meanwhile, ISWAP, recognized by ISIS under Abu Musab al-Barnawi’s leadership, continues to expand its areas of operation and deepen its ties with communities.

The global media and politicians often suggest that Boko Haram is the only or most dangerous jihadist group operating in the region. However, the group has long ago split into new factions, with ISWAP emerging as a separate entity in March 2015 when Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State.

The strategy tailored to ISWAP's targeting tactics allowed JAS nearly free range to conduct its violence. This was exemplified in 2019 when Nigeria adopted the 'super camp strategy,' consolidating soldiers into a few, heavily fortified bases. This move, ostensibly decreasing violence against security forces, allowed JAS to murder civilians and raze villages without much opposition.

Experts such as Stephanie Lizzo, a master's student at Sciences Po concentrating in African studies and intelligence, and Jason Warner, an assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy and an associate of the Combating Terrorism Center, stress the importance of understanding the distinct motivations and methods of each faction. An imperative lesson learned from the past decade is that effective efforts to counter Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) depend on crafting carefully tailored approaches unique to each VEO in question.

ISWAP, for instance, seeks to win hearts and minds of civilians in its areas of operation, providing education, health services, and financial assistance. It has attempted to create four caliphates, or states with a governor and bureaucratic structure, throughout the Lake Chad area. This contrasts sharply with JAS's indiscriminate violence, which has led to the terrorization of civilian populations and the kidnapping of hundreds of schoolgirls in Chibok in 2014.

The failure to give nuanced attention to factions of VEOs is common and not specific to the case of Boko Haram. It is crucial to remember that neither JAS nor ISWAP has been eradicated, and each will continue to exploit the weaknesses in policies that do not treat each faction as a distinct entity. This underscores the importance of paying acute attention to ground-level affinities and adopting strategies that address the root causes of each faction's genesis and persistence.

There are rumors that JAS and ISWAP may merge again, emphasizing the need for continued vigilance and adaptive policies. The Boko Haram disaggregation problem presents an example of how an incomplete understanding of VEOs' disparate motivations and methods can engender suboptimal kinetic and nonkinetic policies to address them. As the conflict in northeastern Nigeria continues, it is essential to maintain a nuanced understanding of the various factions and tailor strategies accordingly to ensure the safety and security of the region's civilians.

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